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The post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) first identified over 40 years ago seems to be as 
much alive today as it ever was. Numerous attempts have been made to explain its continued 
existence. In this paper we provide evidence to support a new explanation: that the PEAD is a 
reflection of the level of market uncertainty and sentiment that prevails during the post-
announcement period. The finding that uncertainty plays a role in explaining how investors 
respond to information suggests that it should be included as a factor in pricing models while the 
fact that market sentiment also has a role is another instance of the importance of  human 
behaviour in establishing prices.  
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1.  Introduction 
 The post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is the oldest continuing market anomaly, 
dating back to the first event study published over 40 years ago (Ball and Brown, 1968). Ball 
(1978) notes that at least 20 papers in the decade post-Ball and Brown have found evidence of a 
PEAD. If we move forward almost 35 years to the present empirical studies are still finding 
evidence of a PEAD with stocks reporting good (bad) news continuing to realise positive 
(negative) excess returns for an extended period beyond the earnings announcement date (Ali et 
al., 2008; Konchitchki et al., 2010; Forner et al., 2009). A number of authors have suggested that 
the PEAD (along with momentum), being proved robust across time, markets and methodologies 
(e.g., Fama, 1998; Kothari, 2001), represents the most serious challenge to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH).  
 Since Ball (1978), a continuing stream of authors have attempted to explain the PEAD 
either within a rational expectations framework or by appealing to behavioural explanations. 
Explanations proposed include arbitrage risk (Mendenhall, 2004), liquidity risk (Sadka, 2006), 
and unsophisticated investors (Bartov et al., 2000).  However, the explanation that has gained 
most attention in recent years has been information uncertainty (Francis et al., 2007). The starting 
point of this argument is that high uncertainty with respect to information release (because of the 
information’s perceived low quality) translates into a smaller reaction at the time of the 
announcement. It is the subsequent resolution of this uncertainty that results in the full 
implications of the information being impounded into prices resulting in the drift in returns that 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912195
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has come to be known as the PEAD. Francis et al. (2007) derive a proxy for accounting quality 
based on accruals and demonstrate that companies with perceived lower quality information 
experience greater PEAD.  
 Recent studies examine the impact of market uncertainty, as distinct from uncertainty 
pertaining to a specific information release, on the returns of a specific stock at the time of the 
release of an earnings announcement. These studies find evidence of an asymmetric response at 
the time of information release with the market reacting more to bad news than to good news. 
This is attributed to the pessimism that uncertainty induces in uncertainty-averse investors 
(Williams, 2009; Bird and Yeung, 2010; Kim et al., 2010). Bird and Yeung find that the asymmetric 
response is the greatest when uncertainty is high and sentiment is low but disappears at times 
when uncertainty is low and sentiment is high.  
In this paper, we extend the study of Bird and Yeung (2010) and propose that the PEAD is 
explained by market uncertainty and market sentiment over the post-announcement period. We 
find significant evidence that: (i) the strongest downward drift after a bad earnings 
announcement occurs when uncertainty is the highest over the post-announcement period, and 
(ii) the strongest upward drift following good news announcements occurs during periods when 
uncertainty is low during the post-announcement period. Further, we find that low sentiment 
during the post-announcement period has a downward impact on the level of PEAD. The impact 
of low sentiment on the post-earnings adjustment to the receipt of good news is sufficient to 
produce a downward drift during the post-announcement period.  
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Our results also provide some evidence relevant to the market efficiency in its immediate 
response to an information release. Our findings confirm a PEAD and so are consistent with 
previous evidence that markets initially underreact to most information sources including both 
‚good news‛ and ‚bad news‛ earnings announcements (Kadiyala and Rau, 2005). Such a 
conclusion is at variance with that in other studies that have interpreted evidence of a greater 
initial response to bad news than good news at times of high uncertainty as suggesting that 
investors take a pessimistic view at such times and so underreact to good news but overreact to 
bad news (Williams, 2009; Kim et al., 2010) Such a finding is consistent with several economic 
models largely based on the presumption that investors follow maxmin expected utility (MEU) 
and so base their decisions on the worst case outcomes at times of high uncertainty (Gilboa and 
Schmeidler, 1989).  
We do find evidence consistent with MEU that during the announcement period there is a 
larger downward drift after bad news than an upward drift after good news and that this 
asymmetry increases with higher uncertainty. However, we also find that a higher proportion of 
the market adjustment to good news earnings announcements over the 60-trading day period 
after the announcement occurs at the time of the announcement than is the case for the market 
adjustment to bad news earnings announcement.  In other words we find evidence to support 
both an underreaction and an asymmetric response to information at the time of its release and 
that both of these findings are strengthened when the information is realised at a time of high 
market uncertainty. These two seemingly inconsistent findings can coexist because it appears 
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that per unit of news that there is a much greater overall adjustment to bad news than there is to 
good news.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the PEAD literature 
with concentration on the explanations postulated to explain its existence. Section 3 sets out the 
data and methodology employed in the study. Section 4 reports and discusses the findings. 
Section 5 gives a concluding remark and discusses possible future work in the area. 
2.  Literature Review on Post-Earnings Announcement Drift 
Information efficiency implies that markets quickly impound information into prices. 
However, much empirical evidence indicates that the adjustment process can be quite slow 
extending over several months, or in some cases, several years. Ball and Brown (1968) seminally 
examine the PEAD, which is the continuing drift in returns subsequent to an announcement. Ball 
(1978) points out that while the PEAD is evident in the Ball and Brown and in many subsequent 
studies, it does not become a focus of attention for another decade. Today, the PEAD remains to 
be an anomaly as evidenced by the recent findings of Ali et al. (2008), Konchitchki et al. (2010) 
and Forner et al. (2009). The other side of the coin to a post-announcement drift is the initial 
underreaction to the announcement (Kadiyala and Rau, 2005). Hong and Stein (1999), and 
Barberis et al. (1998) among others have developed models to explain this underreaction.   
The PEAD is classified as one of the major market anomalies. Kothari (2001) concludes his 
survey paper by saying that ‚the PEAD anomaly poses a serious challenge to the efficient 
markets hypothesis. It has survived a battery of tests and many attempts to explain it away.‛  
Not surprisingly then, we continue to see a stream of papers whose focus is on explaining the 
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PEAD with many others such as Ball (1978) arguing that it does not necessarily represent a 
departure from the EMH. One explanation for the phenomenon is that ‚good‛ news companies 
are inherently more risky than ‚bad‛ news companies (Bernard and Thomas, 1989). The authors 
conclude that at best, risk could explain only a small proportion of the PEAD and this conclusion 
has gone largely unchallenged. Another line of explanation dating back to Ball (1978) argues that 
the PEAD is just an artefact of the methodology and/or the data employed to calculate the 
abnormal returns rather than an indication of any market inefficiency (Jones and Litzenberger, 
1970; Jacob et al., 2000). However, the results have remained robust to numerous alternative 
methodologies and the data problems are no longer a concern. Another possibility is that 
difficulties in implementation and/or transaction costs could mean that it is impossible to profit 
from the perceived profits available from exploiting the PEAD. This seems unlikely as Bernard 
and Thomas (1989) demonstrate how the PEAD can be exploited following a very low turnover 
strategy. However, more recent studies have suggested that the PEAD may at least be partially 
explained by the high costs of arbitrage (Medenhall, 2004), and liquidity related risk (Sadka, 
2006).  
All explanations for PEAD discussed to date are attempts to reconcile the evidence on 
PEAD with the efficient markets hypothesis. One proposal suggestive of inefficiencies in markets 
is that investors just get it wrong and consistently underreact to both good and bad earnings 
news. Bernard and Thomas (1990) suggest that investors adopt a very naïve approach when 
evaluating new earnings numbers and fail to recognise their full implications for future earnings. 
This explanation is consistent with the possibility that the less sophisticated investors might be 
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driving the PEAD. Bartov et al. (2000) provide some support for this premise when they find a 
negative relationship between the level of institutional holdings (sophisticated investment) and 
the level of the PEAD. Other authors have taken a behavioural approach and attempted to 
explain the PEAD on one or more of the cognitive biases attributed to investors. Examples of this 
include Frazzini (2006) who demonstrates a link between PEAD and the disposition effect and 
Barberis et al. (1998) who explain it in terms of conservative and representiveness biases.  
Clearly we are far from achieving closure as to the factors that drive the continued 
existence of the PEAD. One recent explanation that we are yet to consider is that the PEAD is 
driven by investor uncertainty as to how to interpret the information. The argument is that 
investor uncertainty in the quality of an information signal causes them to underreact at the time 
of the release of the information. The argument continues that as this uncertainty is resolved, we 
will begin to see the full reaction to the information and so the PEAD is created1. A number of 
studies have provided empirical support for this proposition by confirming that information 
uncertainty is positively related to the magnitude of the PEAD (Zhang, 2006; Francis et al., 2007; 
Anderson et al., 2007; Angelini and Guazzarotti, 2010).  
In this paper we follow up previous studies in a unique way. Past studies to date have 
considered uncertainty at the firm level basing their measure of uncertainty on factors such as 
the company’s use of accruals, its size, its return volatility and the dispersion of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Another stream of research has developed which also focuses on examining 
the impact of uncertainty on the market response to information but uses a market, rather than a 
                                                 
1 The conceptual argument for this proposition can be found in Caskey (2009). 
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firm-specific, measure of uncertainty. The value of a company at any time is contingent on the 
resolution of thousands of factors which impact on the future profitability and risk characteristics 
of the firm. The ability of investors to cope with all of these factors varies significantly over time 
and becomes extremely difficult in the aftermath of certain events such as the 911 disaster, the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the threats to the viability to the European Economic Union. 
The thesis of this paper is that the interpretation that the market places on any information is 
conditioned by the prevailing level of market uncertainty at the time of, and subsequent to, the 
information release.  
There is a relatively new but burgeoning literature on the impact of uncertainty on asset 
valuation. A number of writers (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Epstein and Schneider, 2003) 
have developed models that suggest that uncertainty, like risk, has a negative impact on 
valuation. The most common approach taken in these models is to assume that investors take a 
conservative approach when faced with uncertainty and base their decisions on obtaining the 
best outcome under the worst case scenario (maxmin expected utility). The implications of this 
are that investors apply a very pessimistic overlay when interpreting information that arrives at a 
time of high uncertainty but are relatively more optimistic when it arrives at times when 
uncertainty is benign. An important implication is that there will be an asymmetric response to 
information at times of uncertainty with investors overreacting to bad news and underreacting to 
good news (Epstein and Schneider, 2008). Williams (2009), Bird and Yeung (2010), and Kim et al. 
(2010) have all found evidence to support this asymmetric response2. One important insight 
                                                 
2This contrasts with the research based on information quality which presumes that the market will always underreact to low quality 
information.  
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coming from this line of research is that we should separately examine the market’s response to 
good and bad news rather than bundle them together (Berens, 2010).  
Caskey (2009) proposes that persistent mispricing is consistent with the existence of 
uncertainty-averse (pessimistic) investors and the existence of such investors plays an important 
role in explaining several market anomalies including the PEAD. The focus in this paper is on 
testing this claim by examining the association between the level of market uncertainty 
prevailing during the post-announcement period and the PEAD during this period. Just as the 
level of uncertainty prevailing at the time of the information release impacts on the market 
response at that time, the proposition is that the response during the post-announcement period 
is also conditioned by the level of uncertainty prevailing during the post-announcement period.  
Bird and Yeung (2010) find that it is not only market uncertainty but also market 
sentiment that influences how investors respond to information. Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
demonstrate the influence that sentiment has on prices and Livnat and Petrovitis (2009) extend 
this to the PEAD. The proposition presented in this paper is that the PEAD is significantly 
influenced by both the market uncertainty and market sentiment that prevails over the post-
announcement period. Our empirical findings support this proposition with this finding giving 
partial credence to both the rational and behavioural explanations for the existence of the PEAD. 
3.  Data and Methodology 
The research question in this paper is that the level of both market uncertainty and market 
sentiment prevailing over the post-announcement period will impact on the price behaviour of 
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the stock during this period (i.e., the PEAD). Specifically, we will evaluate the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: High market uncertainty during the post-announcement period will 
increase the downward drift associated with a bad news announcement but mitigate the 
upward drift associated with a good news announcement.  
Hypothesis 2: High market sentiment during the post-announcement period will serve to 
nullify any PEAD associated with bad news stocks and magnify any PEAD associated 
with good news stocks. 
We will address these hypotheses by examining the relationship between market 
uncertainty and market sentiment over the 60 trading days post-announcement. The analysis 
should provide insights into a number of other important questions: 
 whether the initial response of the market to new information is consistent with 
market efficiency 
 whether the initial market response to new information is an underreaction or an 
overreaction and the extent to which this differs between bad news and good news 
 whether there is an asymmetric response to bad and good news during the post-
announcement period 
  whether the market is better at quickly incorporating one type (bad or good) of 




The sample period used in this study extends from January 1986 to September 2009. We 
use three types of data: data from the equity market, data from the options market, and 
accounting data. The return data from the equity market are obtained from CRSP through 
WRDS. Our measure of market uncertainty is the Implied Volatility Index (VIX) from CBOE3. 
The accounting data which includes reported earnings are obtained from the 
CRSP/COMPUTSTAT merged database which is sourced through WRDS. Finally information on 
actual earnings and financial analysts earnings forecasts are sourced from the IBES summary.  
To be included in the final sample, we required the firms to have earnings announcements 
in at least the past 5 quarters. We also required information on firm characteristics (such as book-
to-market and firm size), VIX and firm returns at the time of the earnings announcements. 
Consistent with standard practice, we have removed any observations with a negative book to 
market value.  Finally, in order to reduce the impact of outliers, firm characteristics have been 
trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles.   
In the following section, we provide a brief discussion on the calculation of the three 
major variables used in our study: (i) unexpected earnings, (ii) market uncertainty, and (iii) 
market sentiment: 
(i) Unexpected earnings (UE) 
The study revolves around evaluating stocks returns in the period after the release of an 
earnings announcement. More specifically, we study how uncertainty and sentiment play vital 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed explanation of the calculation of the PEAD, see Williams (2009). 
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roles in determining the PEAD.  Central to our analysis is the unexpected component of the 
earnings announcement which we measure as the difference between the actual EPS and the 
consensus earnings estimate in the month immediately prior to announcement (Han and Wild 
1990, Francis et al., 2007 and Kaestner 2006). So the unexpected portion of the earnings 
announcement of firm i can be expressed as: 
iii EarningsExpectedEPSActualEarningsUnexpected 
 
where Expected Earnings is defined as the Concensus EPS Estimate for firm i.
 
 
Consistent with the literature (Kaestner 2006), we scaled the unexpected earnings by the 
absolute value of actual EPS to arrive at our final measure of unexpected earnings4. The scaled 










The scaling of the unexpected earnings standardises earnings surprises across our sample 
and thus allows us to examine the influence of news on the returns of the firms5. A positive 
unexpected earnings (PUE) event occurs when the earnings just announced exceed expected 
earnings. Similarly, a negative unexpected earnings (NUE) event occurs when the earnings just 
announced fall short of expected earnings.  
                                                 
4 We also tried several other measures of unexpected earnings including the unscaled unexpected earnings and SUE the unexpected 
earnings standardised by the standard deviation of analysts estimates with similar findings.  
5
 Both Williams (2009) and Bird and Yeung (2010) adopted a similar methodology to standardise earnings surprises prior to 
analysing the impact of uncertainty on investors’ behaviour.   
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 (ii) Market uncertainty 
A suitable proxy for market uncertainty is critical in this paper.  Francis et al. (2007) have 
used the quality of information emanating from a firm as indicated by its use of accruals to proxy 
for uncertainty, while others have used disagreement among experts such as analysts as a 
measure of the difficulty market participants had in interpreting the implications of the 
information (Barron et al., 1998; Zhang, 2006).  However, all these proxies are designed to 
measure uncertainty at the firm level whereas we require a market-wide measure of uncertainty. 
Anderson et al. (2009) obtain such a measure by aggregating the analysts’ earnings forecasts for 
all firms and using the dispersions in these aggregated forecasts as a quarterly macro-measure of 
uncertainty. However, Anderson et al.’s measure cannot be calculated on the daily basis required 
in this study6.  In this study, we have measured uncertainty by the implied volatility from the 
options market (i.e., VIX) which is used by Williams (2009), Drechsler (2009), Bird and Yeung 
(2010), and Kim et al. (2010),  as this is available on a daily basis7. Although some critics have 
suggested that VIX provides an estimate of risk rather than uncertainty, we contend that recent 
studies suggest otherwise.  Drechsler (2009) provides support for VIX through a general 
equilibrium model that incorporates time-varying Knightian uncertainty. The model explains 
that the large hedging/variance premium is evidenced in the markets. Drechsler argues that the 
large time-varying option premium (reflected in the implied volatility) is consistent with 
investors using options for protection against uncertainty (and time-variation in uncertainty). He 
                                                 
6Another problem with the uncertainty proxy used by Anderson et al. (2009) is that it can be affected by a number of other factors 
such as the heterogeneous beliefs of the analysts.  
7 VIX is calculated continually through the day but we use the level of VIX as at the end of each day. 
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shows through calibration that fluctuations in the variance premium reflect changes in the level 
of uncertainty.  
 
(iii) Market sentiment 
High investor sentiment has the potential to mitigate some of the negative effect of uncertainty. 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) have developed a model for measuring the overall level of investor 
sentiment and used this measure to establish that investors take an overly optimistic stance to 
pricing stocks when sentiment is high while being much more subdued when sentiment is low. 
The problem in using the Baker and Wurgler sentiment index is that it cannot be calculated with 
sufficient frequency to capture short-term variations in sentiment through time. As we wish to 
capture sentiment at the market level we resort to use the S&P 500 index returns realised over the 
post-announcement period to proxy for sentiment.  
 
Methodology 
 The basic model that used in our analysis to establish the association between the PEAD 
and unexpected earnings is: 
Rit = βo + β1NUEit + β2 PUEit + β3 log(MVit) + β4BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit                                          (1) 
where Rit denotes the accumulated excess return8 over the post-announcement period which 
commences on the second day after the announcement and ends on the 60th trading day after the 
announcement (i.e., t+2 to t+60)9.     
                                                 
8 The excess return is calculated on a daily basis as the difference between the daily return on a particular stock and that on the 
S&P500 index.  
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NUE = UE if UE < 0 otherwise NUE = 0 and PUE = UE if UE > 0 otherwise PUE = 0 
MVit = the market capitalisation of firm i at the announcement day, t 
BTMVit = the book-to-market ratio of firm i at the announcement day, t 
With no drift, the coefficients β1 and β2 are expected to be not significantly different from zero. 
We next test the extent to which the level of PEAD is affected by the level of uncertainty 
(VIX) at the time of the announcement and the extent to which uncertainty changes (∆VIX) over 
the post-announcement period. In order to do this, we determine the level of VIX at the time of 
each announcement and the change in VIX over the post-period. We expand Equation 1 to 
incorporate these two additional variables into the following regression equation: 
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7X3NUEit + 
β8X3PUEit + β9log(MVit) + β10BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit                                      (2) 
where  
X1 = 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level of VIX at time 
t ranks in the second tercile where all level of market uncertainty (VIX) are ranked from 
low to high; otherwise X1 = 0. 
X2 = 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level of VIX at time 
t ranks in the third tercile where all level of market uncertainty (VIX) are ranked from 
low to high; otherwise X2 = 0. 
X3 = 1 where there is an increase in the level of VIX increase over the post-announcement 
period (as measure by the difference between the level of VIX at the time of 
announcement, VIXt, and the  level of VIX 60 days post announcement, VIXt+60); 
otherwise X3 = 0. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9We also undertook the same analysis using a post-announcement period extending from the second day after the announcement to 
the 30th trading day after the announcement. As the findings were the same we only report our findings for the longer post-
announcement period.  
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In this case we will define high uncertainty as being where the level of VIX is in the top 
quartile at the time of the announcement and increases over the post-announcement period. 
Similarly we define low uncertainty as being where the level of VIX is in the bottom quartile at 
the time of the announcement and decreases over the post-announcement period.    
We next expand our analysis to incorporate market sentiment into the analysis. We do this 
by introducing as an additional variable the momentum over the post-announcement period. 
Our expanded regression equation is set out below: 
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7X3NUEit + 
β8X3PUEit + β9X4NUEit + β10X4PUEit + β11X5NUEit + β12X5PUEit + β13log(MVit) + β14BTMVit  + 
Year Effects + εit  (3) 
 
where 
X4= 1 if the return on S&P 500 Index from t+2 to t+60 ranks in the second tercile where all 
S&P 500 Index {t+2, t+60} are ranked from low to high; otherwise X4 = 0. 
X5= 1 if the return on S&P 500 Index from t+2 to t+60 ranks in the third tercile where all S&P 




Our final sample set comprises of 325,888 observations of quarterly earnings 
announcements. Summary statistics for our final sample are reported in Table 1. It can be seen 
that the magnitude of bad news is approximately twice as large as it is for good news with this 
proportion remaining fairly constant across all levels of uncertainty (VIX) and sentiment (MOM). 
There is only slight variation in the size of the firms making announcements across the various 
sub-samples, the major departure being the preponderance of smaller firms that make earnings 
announcements at times when uncertainty is low. Finally, the greatest variation highlighted in 
Table 1 is that growth stocks are far more likely than value stocks to release their earnings figures 
during periods when markets are experiencing low uncertainty.  
Insert Table 1 
4.  Empirical Results 
 In this section, we show that our empirical results affirm the existence of a PEAD in our 
sample data, confirm that the PEAD is influenced by the level of market uncertainty and market 
sentiment prevailing over the post-announcement period, that the PEAD for smaller firms is both 
greater and more volatile than it is for larger firms, and that growth stocks are more impacted by 
the joint effects of uncertainty and sentiment than are value stocks. 
(i)  PEAD 
The first question that we address is whether there is a post-earnings announcement drift 
in our data. In order to evaluate this we apply our data to Equation 1: 
Rit = βo + β1NUEit + β2 PUEit + β3log(MVit) + β4BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit 
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The coefficients reported for β1 and β2 in Table 2 are both significant and positive.  Our 
findings thus confirm that the existence of a PEAD with the signs expected in association with 
the release of good and bad earnings news10. The most interesting finding is that the sign 
attached to the bad news announcements is significantly larger to that attached to the good news 
announcements. The implication of our findings is that the market underreacts to both bad and 
good news earnings announcements but there is a greater underreaction to bad news than to 
good news. In order to investigate this further we ran the same regression as for Table 2 but this 
time with excessive return over the three-day announcement variables (i.e. t-1 to t+1) as the 
dependent variable. We found the coefficient on both NUE and PUE to be positive and highly 
significant with little difference in their magnitude.  By comparing these coefficients to those 
reported in Table 2, we conclude about half of the reaction of the market to bad news over the 60 
trading days inclusive of the announcement period occurred during the announcement period 
whereas in the case of good news two-thirds of the reaction took place during the announcement 
period. This evidence is also consistent with a larger underreaction to bad news than to good 
news.  
Insert Table 2 
                                                 
10As can be seen from table 2, the coefficients attached to both the control variables are significant. Indeed in all of our egressions 
there is a positive coefficient attached to the size variable and a significant negative coefficient attached to the value/growth variable. 
In the interest of clear exposition, we do not report the coefficient for these variables in future tables.  
 19 
(ii)  Market Uncertainty at the Time of the Announcement 
 
Although previous studies concluded that the market response to the release of 
information is impacted by the level of uncertainty prevailing at the time, there is disagreement 
as to the nature of this impact. Some studies claim that uncertainty causes investors to underreact 
to both bad and good news with the PEAD reflecting a subsequent adjustment to the information 
(e.g., Francis et al., 2007) whereas other studies claim that uncertainty causes investors to take a 
pessimistic stance and so overreact to bad news and underreact to good news (e.g., Williams, 
2009). Although these two explanations both suggest a subsequent upward adjustment to good 
news, the former suggests a further downward adjustment following a bad news announcement 
while the latter suggests a correction with a subsequent drift upwards in price (e.g., Francis et al., 
2007; Williams, 2009; Bird et al., 2011). We evaluate these propositions by running the following 
regression which is a reduced form of Equation 2:  
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7log(MVit) + 
β8BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit 
Our findings reported in Table 3 indicate that there is a significant and positive PEAD 
associated with both bad and good news when uncertainty is both low and high at the time of 
the announcement. In the case of both bad and good news, the coefficient attached to unexpected 
earnings is higher when the announcement is made at times of high market uncertainty but the 
difference is only significant in the case of bad news. Further, the coefficient attached to bad 
news is always larger than that attached to good news but this difference is only (highly) 
significant at times when uncertainty is high. Two important insights can be drawn from our 
empirical findings. First, the evidence confirms that the PEAD is higher, particularly for bad 
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news, when it is released at the time when market uncertainty is high. Second, we find the same 
asymmetric response to bad news and good news in the post-announcement period when 
market uncertainty is high as others have noted at the time of the release of the information.  To 
conclude, the evidence confirms the proposition that the market underreacts to all information 
and that this underreaction is greater for bad news, particularly when high uncertainty prevails 
at the time of the information release.  These findings thus challenge the validity of market 
efficiency and suggest that investors faced with high uncertainty as to how factors will evolve in 
the future will fail (even more) to realise the importance of new information as is evidenced by 
the trend that the market follows in the post-announcement period.  
Insert Table 3 
(iii) Changes in Uncertainty over the Post-Announcement Period 
It is evident that the level of uncertainty prevailing at the time of an earnings 
announcement impacts the magnitude of subsequent PEADs. We now examine the extent the 
level of uncertainty prevailing over the post-announcement period impacts the magnitude of 
PEADs.  In order to evaluate this issue, we apply the sample data to Equation 2: 
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7X3NUEit + 
β8X3PUEit + β9log(MVit) + β10BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit 
In Table 2, the coefficient on NUE is 0.0151, indicating a significant downward drift after 
bad news announcements. From Table 4, when uncertainty (VIX) starts low and decreases during 
the post-announcement period, the coefficient of NUE becomes 0.0085, indicating a significant 
but alleviated downward drift. In contrast, when uncertainty starts high and increases during the 
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post-announcement period, the coefficient of NUE is 0.0220, indicating a significant and stronger 
downward drift. Further, the magnitude of the downward drift is greater where uncertainty is 
low at the time of the announcements but increases over the post-announcement period (i.e., the 
coefficient of NUE is 0.0158) than where it is high at the time of the announcement and 
subsequently decreases over the post-announcement period (i.e., the coefficient of NUE is 
0.0147).  These findings highlight that the level of uncertainty over the post-announcement 
period is critical in determining the magnitude of the PEAD after a bad news announcement.  
NUE: The results in Table 3 show that there is a downward drift after a bad news 
announcement irrespective of the level of uncertainty prevailing over the post-announcement 
period. This is a strong indication of an underreaction to the information at the time of its release. 
Based on this evidence, if one accepts that markets are inefficient, then one would also have to 
accept that the full adjustment process is still incomplete even for 60 trading days after the 
announcement. If this is the case, one cannot rule out the possibility of a prolonged period of 
high uncertainty during the post-announcement period resulting in an eventual overreaction to 
the bad news announcement and a prolonged period of low uncertainty during this period 
resulting in the full price adjustment remaining incomplete.  
Insert Table 4 
PUE: In table 2, the coefficient on PUE is 0.0091, indicating a significant upward drift after 
good news announcements. From Table 4, the level of uncertainty over the post-announcement 
period has an even greater impact on PEAD after a good news announcement than after a bad 
news announcement. When uncertainty (VIX) starts low and decreases, there is a much larger 
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upward drift over the post-announcement period (i.e., the coefficient of PUE = 0.0236) with the 
correction to an initial underreaction unmitigated by the negative impact that high market 
uncertainty can have on investor behaviour. When we examine the PEAD after a good news 
announcement over a period when market uncertainty (VIX) starts high and increases, we see 
that the usual upward drift is replaced by a downward drift (the coefficient of PUE = 0.0124). In 
other words, the negative impact that high uncertainly can have on investor behaviour is 
sufficient to offset the normal upward drift associated with a correction to an initial 
underreaction to the good news announcement. Indeed, the importance of the level of 
uncertainty prevailing during the post-announcement is highlighted by the fact that there is a 
downward drift after good news announcements at such times irrespective of the level of 
uncertainty prevailing at the time of the announcement.   Overall, our findings highlight that the 
path that a stock price follows after an initial underreaction to a good news announcement is 
even more impacted by the prevailing uncertainty during this period than was the case for bad 
news.  
We previously found that investors underreact to both good and bad news 
announcements especially when the announcement is made at a time of high market uncertainty. 
We have now found that the PEAD associated with a correction to the initial underreaction is 
considerably affected by the level of uncertainty that prevails over the post-announcement 
period. In the case of a bad news announcement, the impact of uncertainty is to slow down the 
typical downward drift. However, in the case of a good news announcement, the impact of 
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uncertainty is to turn the more typical upward drift to a downward drift during the post- 
announcement period. 
(iv) Market Sentiment 
Our second proposition is that market sentiment will serve to offset uncertainty in terms 
of its impact on the PEAD. We divide our sample on the basis of the level of sentiment prevailing 
over the post-announcement period with high (low) sentiment being when market momentum is 
strong (weak). In order to evaluate this proposition, we apply our sample data to Equation 3:  
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7X3NUEit + 
β8X3PUEit + β9X4NUEit + β10X4PUEit + β11X5NUEit + β12X5PUEit + β13log(MVit) + β14BTMVit  + 
Year Effects + εit 
Insert Table 5 
 Based on the information contained in Table 5, there is always a downward drift 
after a bad news earnings announcement irrespective of the level of market uncertainty and 
market sentiment prevailing over the post-announcement period. As already noted, the greatest 
downward drift occurs when high uncertainty prevails over the post-announcement period and 
this can be seen from Table 5.  The downward drift is stronger after bad news announcements 
when low sentiment prevails (with the difference between high and low sentiment being 
significant at the 10% level). The combined effect of uncertainty and sentiment can be seen when 
we compare the coefficient attached to NUE when uncertainty is high and sentiment is low 
(0.0234) with the coefficient when uncertainty is low and sentiment is high (0.0064). The 
difference is significant at the 1% level and highlights the extent to which both uncertainty and 
sentiment impact on the PEAD after bad news with the negative drift when uncertainty is high 
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and sentiment is low being four-times greater than when uncertainty is low and sentiment is 
high. 
The findings with respect to PEAD after a good news announcement are similar, but more 
complicated, than those reported above for bad news announcements. As with bad news, high 
uncertainty during the post-announcement period has been shown to have a negative impact on 
investors which translates into a lower, indeed negative, PEAD. We can now see from the 
information presented in Table 5 that sentiment has a larger impact on the market’s response to 
good news than it does to bad news. In fact, there is always an upward drift after a good 
earnings announcement when market sentiment is strong over the post-announcement period 
irrespective of what level of market uncertainty prevails. Perhaps even more interesting is that 
the drift during the post-announcement period after the release of good news is always negative 
when market sentiment is low, again irrespective of the prevailing level of uncertainty. The 
combined effect of uncertainty and sentiment can be seen when we compare the extent of the 
upward drift following a good news announcement  when uncertainty is low and sentiment is 
high (coefficient = 0.0267) with the extent of the downward drift when uncertainty is high and 
sentiment is low (coefficient  = -0.0161). The difference is significant at the 1% level and 
highlights that the combination of uncertainty and sentiment has a much greater impact on the 




The evidence provided to date confirms that the level of prevailing market uncertainty 
and market sentiment over the post-announcement period play a critical role in explaining the 
PEAD phenomena. The issue pursued here is whether our findings are sensitive to certain 
characteristics of the firm making the announcement. The two characteristics evaluated are the 
firm’s market capitalisation and its book-to-market ratio as both have been found to have a major 
influence on a firm’s market returns (Fama and French, 1992). In both cases we split our sample 
in half and so produce a sub-sample of large and small stocks, and of value and growth stocks. 
We then repeated the regression as set out in Equation 3 for the large and small sub-samples and 
report our findings in Table 6.  
Small Cap and large Cap 
 We divided our sample into small and large cap stocks and then applied Equation 3 to 
each sub-sample. In Table 6 we repeat the information provided in Table 5 but this time 
separately for large cap and small cap stocks. There are both similarities and differences in terms 
of the PEAD behaviour of large cap and small cap stocks. The similarities are that they retain 
most of the main features discussed previously relating to the whole sample: (i) the downward 
drift following a bad news announcement is largest when the prevailing market uncertainty is 
high and the prevailing market sentiment is low, (ii) the upward drift following a good news 
announcement is largest when the prevailing uncertainty is low and the market sentiment is 
high, and (iii) there is always a downward drift associated with bad news announcements 
irrespective of the prevailing market uncertainty and market sentiment but the drift associated 
 26 
with good news announcements swings between an upward drift and a downward drift  largely 
determined by the level of market sentiment prevailing during the post-announcement period.. 
Insert Table 6 here 
 The PEAD associated with small cap stocks is almost always larger than the PEAD 
associated with large cap stocks. One instance is that for any given level of market uncertainty 
and sentiment, the downward drift over the post-earnings announcement period is always 
greater for small cap stocks than it is for large cap stocks after the release of a bad earnings 
report. There are variations in the importance of the contribution that market uncertainty and 
market sentiment make to the PEAD experienced by large cap and small cap stocks after the 
release of bad news. During the post-announcement period, market sentiment has no material 
impact on the PEAD for large cap stocks but it does have for small cap stocks. In contrast, market 
uncertainty is more important in impacting the PEAD after the release of bad news by large cap 
stocks than it is by small cap stocks.  
 As has been typically the case throughout this paper, an examination of the drift after a 
good news announcement proves to be the most interesting.  Irrespective of the market 
uncertainty experienced over the post-announcement period, a prevailing low sentiment always 
results in both large and small cap stocks experiencing a downward drift.  The difference is that 
this downward drift is rarely significant in the case of small cap stocks but nearly always 
significant in the case of large cap stocks.  In contrast, both large cap and small cap stocks always 
experience an upward drift in excess returns when sentiment is high over the post-
announcement period irrespective of the market uncertainty prevailing over this period. The 
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magnitude of this upward drift is fairly similar for both large and small cap stocks when market 
uncertainty at the time of the announcement is low but the drift is very much greater for small 
cap stocks when uncertainty is high at the time of the announcement.   
Growth and Value Stocks 
 In Table 7 we present a summary of our findings where we repeat the analysis reported 
above for large cap and small cap stocks, this time dividing the stocks up into growth and values 
stocks as indicated by each stock’s book-to-market ratio. As with large and small cap stocks, 
there is a clear difference between the PEAD behaviour of growth and value stocks with the 
variation of the drift for growth stocks over the post-announcement period being much larger 
than for value stocks. Again we find consistency with previous findings re the PEAD behaviour 
of both growth and value stocks: (i) the downward drift following a bad news announcement is 
largest when the prevailing market uncertainty is high and the prevailing market sentiment is 
low; (ii) the upward drift following a good news announcement is largest when the prevailing 
uncertainty is low and the market sentiment is high; and (iii) there is always a downward drift 
after bad news announcements irrespective of the prevailing market uncertainty and market 
sentiment but the direction of the drift associated with good news announcements swings 
changes depending on the prevailing market  sentiment during the post-announcement period. 
Insert Table 7 here 
 There are several significant differences with respect to the PEAD behaviour of growth 
stocks and value stocks. For instance, the level of downward drift for growth stocks after a bad 
news announcement is twice as large as it is for value stocks during a post-announcement period 
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when uncertainty is high and sentiment low. This result is largely driven by the fact that the 
valuation of growth stocks is very much dependent on the maintenance of investor confidence 
which is likely to be eroded when a disappointing earnings report is combined with a period of 
high market uncertainty and low market confidence (Skinner and Sloan, 2002).  
There is a similar result when it comes to good news, with the upward drift for growth 
companies being almost twice as great as that for value companies during periods when 
uncertainty is low and sentiment is high. This reflects the euphoria associated with a growth 
stock which is being fuelled by both a favourable earnings report and a positive market 
environment. We previously found evidence of a downward drift after the release of good news 
at times of high market uncertainty and low market confidence. The information provided in 
Table 7 enables us to identify that this downward drift is largely confined to growth stocks 
reflecting the brittleness in the pricing of such stocks to the level of prevailing market uncertainty 
and sentiment. On the other hand the valuation of value stocks is much less dependent on 
confidence and so is less affected by earnings news, market uncertainty and market confidence.  
(vi) Profitable Investment Strategies 
 Previous discussion has provided us with some useful insights as to factors that will 
impact on the PEAD experienced by a stock. This raises the question as to whether the insights 
might be sufficient to give rise to an implementable investment strategy. At this time it is 
appropriate to point out that some of the factors identified such as the prevailing market 
uncertainty and sentiment over the post-announcement period cannot be foreseen by investors at 
the time of the information release. However, factors known at this time include the nature of the 
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information released (whether it was good news or bad news), the market uncertainty and 
sentiment prevailing at the time of the information release, the size of the company and whether 
a growth stock or a value stock at the time. Therefore, we examined how all of these variables 
could be used to predict the future performance of the stock over the post-announcement period. 
The results are reported in Table 8. 
Insert Table 8 here 
 First, in examining the full sample, we see that it is the stocks that have experienced a 
positive earnings surprise at times when both market uncertainty and market sentiment are high 
that have the largest positive coefficient attached to their PUE and so are most likely to 
experience the largest positive PEAD. At the other end of the spectrum, the greatest potential 
downward post-announcement drift would seem to be associated with stocks that have made a 
bad news announcement when VIX is high and sentiment low.  The strategy this suggests is to 
buy stocks shortly after they have made a good news earnings announcement at a time of high 
market uncertainty and sentiment and short stocks shortly after they have made a bad news 
earnings announcement at a time of high market uncertainty and low market sentiment11. 
Further, it would appear that this strategy could be further enhanced by restricting the purchases 
to small cap stocks and the shorts to growth stocks.  
 
                                                 
11
 Preliminary analysis suggests that such strategies would add about 4% over the post-announcment period which equates with 
an annualised return of about 17% 
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5.  Concluding Remarks 
Our findings provide support for the suggestion that it is the state of mind of investors in concert 
with the clarity with which they interpret the information that work together to determine how 
they respond to an earnings signal in the weeks immediately after that signal is made public. At 
one extreme, we have a situation of high market uncertainty and low market sentiment which 
means investors have difficulty in interpreting the implications of the earnings announcement 
for the value of the firm at a time when a negative tone overlays all of their investing. It is not 
surprising that at such times investors react more to bad news resulting in a negative drift after 
the release of both bad and good news. At the other extreme, we have a situation of low market 
uncertainty and high market sentiment prevailing during the post-announcement period which 
is a period where there is greater clarity as to the implications of any new information coinciding 
with a time when investors are somewhat euphoric with respect to their investing. Again, it is 
not surprising that at such times investors respond to new information in a much more positive 
way resulting in an upward drift after the release of good news and a significantly lower 
downward drift after bad news. The major findings hold when we divide our sample both by 
size and also value/growth. However, the PEAD for small cap (and growth) stocks is more 
volatile than for large cap (and value) stocks.   
Of course, there could not be a PEAD if markets fully reflected new information within a 
very short period of time of its release. Our findings extend the evidence that the market is slow 
in incorporating information into prices. Two other aspects of our findings are worthy of further 
comment. First, it would appear that on average the market incorporates more bad news than 
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good news into pricing at the time of the information release. Indeed, the impression is that the 
market is much more efficient in incorporating bad news into prices than it is for good news. 
This can be seen when one observes the large positive drift following good news announcements 
at times of low uncertainty viz-viz no trend following bad news announcements at these times. 
Second, it would appear that the overall reaction to bad news is greater than it is to good news. 
The simplest way to see this is by looking at Table 2 where we see that the drift following bad 
news is twice that following good news. We would propose uncertainty provides a major 
explanation for why the market is more responsive to bad news than to good news. The market 
is always subject to some uncertainty when trying to interpret information which means there is 
always a tendency towards an asymmetric reaction by the market to bad news and good news. 
However as noted sentiment sometimes works to offset this asymmetric response and even at 
times to reverse it.   
In this paper we have validated the importance of the role market uncertainty and market 
sentiment play in explaining the existence of a PEAD. Undoubtedly they, like many of the other 
factors identified, do not provide the complete explanation.  The opportunity remains for future 
researchers to provide a more complete and integrative explanation for the PEAD but in this 
paper we have made a significant contribution towards making this possible. 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics 
 Full sample VIX Lo VIX Hi VIX- VIX+ 
Variable Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
NUE -0.534 0.790 -0.490 0.751 -0.570 0.815 -0.541 0.791 -0.527 0.789 
PUE 0.247 0.468 0.228 0.431 0.270 0.516 0.256 0.479 0.237 0.454 
MV 1941.7 4933.5 1563.4 4116.4 1809.4 4744.45 1877.4 4771.2 2018.5 5119.8 
BTMV 0.677 0.775 0.515 0.535 0.824 0.984 0.715 0.819 0.630 0.715 
 Full sample MOM Lo MOM Hi MOM Lo Post MOM Hi Post 
Variable Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
NUE -0.534 0.790 -0.538 0.792 -0.540 0.799 -0.517 0.779 -0.548 0.794 
PUE 0.247 0.468 0.250 0.475 0.252 0.487 0.244 0.471 0.258 0.481 
MV 1941.7 4933.5 1933.0 4943.2 1938.8 4960.4 2108.2 5229.7 1766.3 4605.4 
BTMV 0.677 0.775 0.704 0.828 0.685 0.784 0.688 0.859 0.700 0.774 
Notes:  
The sample contains earnings announcements from January 1986 to September 2009. Company information data are sourced from CRSP/COMPUTSTAT Merged 
database. Returns data are gathered from CRSP. The measure of market uncertainty is the Implied Volatility Index from CBOE. VIX- (and VIX+) represents a decrease 
(increase) in the level of VIX measured between the announcement date and 60 days after the announcement. VIX Lo represents the sample of announcements made when 
the level of volatility is in the lowest tercile when all announcements in the sample are ranked by the level of uncertainty. Similarly VIX Hi Lo represents the sample of 
announcements made when volatility level falls in the highest tercile. MOM Lo represents the sample of announcements where the S&P 500 Index returns in the 5 days 
prior to the announcement ranks in the lowest tercile. Similarly MOM Hi represents the sample of announcements where the S&P 500 Index returns in the 5 days prior to 
the announcement ranks in the highest tercile. Mom Lo Post includes all announcements where the S&P 500 Index returns in the post announcement period (which 
commences on the second day after the announcement and ends on the 60
th
 trading day after the announcement) falls within the lowest tercile in the sample. Similarly Mom 
Hi Post represents announcements by firms where the market (as measured by S&P 500 index) exhibited the highest returns for the post announcement period {t+2, t+60}. 
PUE are events where the announced earnings are greater than the expected earnings where expected earnings are defined as last year’s earnings.  PUE is calculated by 
multiplying the unexpected earning by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there is positive earnings surprises and 0 otherwise. Similarly, a negative unexpected 
earnings (NUE) event occurs when the earnings just announced fall short of expected earnings. MV represents the market capitalisation at the time of the announcement 






Analysis of Post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) 





Test of Difference NUE>PUE*** 
Notes:  
The above table reported the basic results for the basic regression (or equation 1) :  
 
Rit = βo + β1NUEit + β2 PUEit + β3 log(MVit) + β4BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit. 
 
The dependent variable, Rit, is the accumulated excess return over the post-announcement period which 
commences on the second day after the announcement and ends on the 60
th
 trading day after the 
announcement (i.e., t+2 to t+60).  The unexpected portion of an earnings announcement is defined as the 
difference between the actual earnings and the consensus earnings estimate in the month immediately 
prior to announcement. We scaled the unexpected portion of the earnings announcement by the actual 
earnings announced to arrive at our final measure of unexpected earnings. PUE are events where the 
announced earnings are greater than the expected earnings where expected earnings.PUE is calculated 
by multiplying the unexpected earning by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there is 
positive earnings surprises and 0 otherwise. Similarly, a negative unexpected earnings (NUE) event 
occurs when the earnings just announced fall short of the consensus analysts forecast earnings.PUE are 
events where the announced earnings are greater than the expected earnings where median analysts 
forecast earnings.  PUE is calculated by multiplying the unexpected earning by a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if there is positive earnings surprises and 0 otherwise. Similarly, a negative 
unexpected earnings (NUE) event occurs when the earnings just announced fall short of expected 
earnings. MV represents the market capitalisation at the time of the announcement and is measured in 
millions. BTMV measures the Book to Market value of the firm making the announcement. Yearly fixed 
effects are included but not reported in the results. The notations ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance 




The impact of uncertainty levels on the Post earnings announcement drift 
  Coefficient† Test of Difference 
  VIX Lo VIX Hi VIX Lo VIX Hi 
NUE 0.0124*** 0.0163*** 
N>P N>P*** 
PUE 0.0072*** 0.0083*** 
Notes:  
The above table reported the results for the regression : 
 
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7log(MVit) + 
β8BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit 
 
The dependent variable, Rit is the accumulated excess return over the post-announcement period which 
commences on the second day after the announcement and ends on the 60
th
 trading day after the 
announcement (i.e., t+2 to t+60). The unexpected portion of an earnings announcement is defined as the 
difference between the actual earnings and the consensus earnings estimate in the month immediately prior to 
announcement. We scaled the unexpected portion of the earnings announcement by the actual earnings 
announced to arrive at our final measure of unexpected earnings. PUE are events where the announced 
earnings are greater than the expected earnings where expected earnings.PUE is calculated by multiplying 
the unexpected earning by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there is positive earnings surprises 
and 0 otherwise. Similarly, a negative unexpected earnings (NUE) event occurs when the earnings just 
announced fall short of the consensus analysts forecast earnings. X1 is an indicator variable which is equal to 
1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level of VIX at time t ranks in the second 
tercile where all level of market uncertainty (VIX)are ranked from low to high; otherwise X1 = 0. Similarly 
X2 is equal to 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level of VIX at time t ranks 
in the third tercile where all level of market uncertainty (VIX)are ranked from low to high;otherwise X2 = 0. 
For ease of interpretation, we have formatted the above table to show only the results directly related to VIX 
levels. For example, the displayed coefficient for VIX Hi and negative earnings surprise (NUE) is 0.0225 
(i.e. sum of β1 and β3). To test for asymmetry in responses to NUE and PUE, we conduct Wald test on the 
coefficients, the results are reported in the last 2 columns of the table. Yearly Control variable including 
Book to Market values, Market capitalisation and yearly fixed effects are included but not reported in the 
results. The notations ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
 Table 4  
The impact of uncertainty levels and changes in uncertainty on PEAD 
  NUE PUE Test of Difference 
  VIX Lo VIX Hi   VIX Lo VIX Hi VIX Lo VIX Hi 
↓∆VIX 0.0085*** 0.0147*** ↓∆VIX 0.0236*** 0.0154*** P>N*** P>N 
↑∆VIX 0.0158*** 0.0220*** ↑∆VIX -0.0043 -0.0124*** N>P*** N>P*** 
Notes:  
In table 4, we examine the combined impact of uncertainty level and changes in uncertainty on PEAD. Changes in uncertainty are defined as the difference between the level of 
uncertainty on the day of the announcement and the level of uncertainty 60 days post announcement. We rank the changes in uncertainty across the sample of announcement. 
↓∆VIX represents the sample of announcements that falls within the first tercile in terms of changes in uncertainty (i.e. announcements that are followed by decrease in market 
uncertainty in the post announcement period). ↑∆VIX represents the sample of announcements that reregistered that ranks in the third tercile (i.e. announcements follow by the 
increase in uncertainty level). Then we run the following regression (or equation 2) :  
 
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7X3NUEit + β8X3PUEit + β9log(MVit) + β10BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit 
 
The dependent variable, Rit is the accumulated excess return over the post-announcement period (i.e., t+2 to t+60). PUE are events where the announced earnings are greater than 
the expected earnings where expected earnings.PUE is calculated by multiplying the unexpected earning by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there is positive 
earnings surprises and 0 otherwise. Similarly, a negative unexpected earnings (NUE) event occurs when the earnings just announced fall short of the consensus analysts forecast 
earnings. X1 is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level of VIX at time t ranks in the second tercile where all 
level of market uncertainty (VIX)are ranked from low to high; otherwise X1 = 0. Similarly X2 is equal to 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level of 
VIX at time t ranks in the third tercile where all level of market uncertainty (VIX)are ranked from low to high;otherwise X2 = 0.X3is equal to 1 where there is an increase in the 
level of VIX increase over the post-announcement period (as measure by the difference between the level of VIX at the time of announcement, VIX tand the  level of VIX 60 days 
post announcement, VIXt+60); otherwise X3 = 0.For ease of interpretation, we have formatted the above table to show only the results directly related to VIX levels. For example, 
the displayed coefficient for VIX Hi and negative earnings surprise (NUE) is the sum of β1 and β3. Yearly fixed effects are included but not reported in the results. The notations 




The effect of Uncertainty and Sentiment on the Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
Total Sample 
NUE       PUE 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Levels Trend Lo Hi  Levels Trend Lo Hi 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX 0.0101*** 0.0062*** 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX -0.0037 0.0267*** 
Lo ↑∆VIX 0.0168*** 0.0129*** Lo ↑∆VIX -0.0133*** 0.0172*** 
Hi ↓∆VIX 0.0167*** 0.0128*** Hi ↓∆VIX -0.0065** 0.0239*** 
Hi ↑∆VIX 0.0234*** 0.0195*** Hi ↑∆VIX -0.0161*** 0.0143*** 
Notes:  
In table 5, the impact of momentum is introduced into the analysis. Momentum refers to market momentum and is measured by the S&P 500 index returns in the period 2 
days to 60 days after the announcement (i.e. t+2 to t+60).  The above table reported the results for the regression (or equation 3): 
 
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7X3NUEit + β8X3PUEit + β9X4NUEit + β10X4PUEit + β11X5NUEit + β12X5PUEit + 
β13log(MVit) + β14BTMVit  + Year Effects + εit   
The dependent variable, Rit is the accumulated excess return over the post-announcement period (i.e., t+2 to t+60). PUE and NUE represent positive and negative earnings 
surprise respectively. X1 is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level of VIX at time t ranks in the second 
tercile where all level of market uncertainty (VIX)are ranked from low to high; otherwise X1 = 0. Similarly X2 is equal to 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at 
time t and the level of VIX at time t ranks in the third tercile where all level of market uncertainty (VIX)are ranked from low to high;otherwise X2 = 0.X3is equal to 1 where 
there is an increase in the level of VIX increase over the post-announcement period (as measure by the difference between the level of VIX at the time of announcement, 
VIXtand the  level of VIX 60 days post announcement, VIXt+60); otherwise X3 = 0. X4= 1 if the return on S&P 500 Index from t+2 to t+60 ranks in the second tercile where 
all S&P 500 Index {t+2, t+60} are ranked from low to high; otherwise X4 = 0.X5= 1 if the return on S&P 500 Index from t+2 to t+60 ranks in the third tercile where all S&P 
500 Index {t+2, t+60} are ranked from low to high; otherwise X5 = 0.For ease of interpretation, we have formatted the above table to show only the results directly related to 
the impact of VIX levels and the Post announcement sentiment level. For example, the table indicates where there is low level of Uncertainty at announcement followed by 
high sentiment but also an increase in uncertainty (VIX↑) in the post announcement period,  the coefficient associated with NUE is 0.00129 (i.e., β1 + β7+ β11). Control 
variables such as market capitalisation, book to market value and yearly fixed effects are included but not reported in the results. The notations ***, ** and * denotes 






The effect of Uncertainty and Sentiment on the Post Earnings Announcement Drift by Market Capitalisation 
Panel A: Large Cap Sample 
NUE    PUE 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Levels Trend Lo Hi   Levels Trend Lo Hi 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX 0.0024 0.0007 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX -0.0087 0.0223*** 
Lo ↑∆VIX 0.0085** 0.0068 Lo ↑∆VIX -0.0126*** 0.0184*** 
Hi ↓∆VIX 0.0094*** 0.0077** Hi ↓∆VIX -0.0257*** 0.0053 
Hi ↑∆VIX 0.0155*** 0.0138*** Hi ↑∆VIX -0.0296*** 0.0014 
 
Panel B: Small Cap Sample 
NUE    PUE 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Levels Trend Lo Hi   Levels Trend Lo Hi 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX 0.0145*** 0.0096*** 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX -0.0043 0.0260*** 
Lo ↑∆VIX 0.0192*** 0.0142*** Lo ↑∆VIX -0.0125*** 0.0179*** 
Hi ↓∆VIX 0.0161*** 0.0112*** Hi ↓∆VIX 0.0031 0.0335*** 
Hi ↑∆VIX 0.0208*** 0.0158*** Hi ↑∆VIX -0.0050 0.0253*** 
Notes: In table 6, we examine whether the impact of uncertainty and Sentiment on the post earnings announcement drift differs for firms of different sizes. To do so, we 
split our sample by market capitalisation into subsamples of small cap firm and large cap firms. We then repeat the analysis as set out in equation 3. Panel A display the 
regression results for the sample of large cap stocks. The results for the sample of small cap stocks are displayed in Panel B. For ease of interpretation, we have formatted the 
above table to show only the results directly related to the impact of VIX levels and the Post announcement sentiment level. For example, the panel B of the table indicates 
where there is low level of Uncertainty at announcement followed by high sentiment but also an increase in uncertainty (VIX↑) in the post announcement period,  the 
coefficient associated with NUE is 0.0142 (i.e., β1 + β7+ β11). Yearly fixed effects are included but not reported in the results. The notations ***, ** and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.    
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Table 7  
The effect of Uncertainty and Sentiment on the Post Earnings Announcement Drift by Growth/Value Stocks 
Panel A: Growth Stocks (Low book-to-market) 
NUE   PUE 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Levels Trend Lo Hi   Levels Trend Lo Hi 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX 0.0112** 0.0081** 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX -0.0113* 0.0360*** 
Lo ↑∆VIX 0.0212*** 0.0181*** Lo ↑∆VIX -0.0249*** 0.0224*** 
Hi ↓∆VIX 0.0272*** 0.0241*** Hi ↓∆VIX -0.0208*** 0.0265*** 
Hi ↑∆VIX 0.0372*** 0.0341*** Hi ↑∆VIX -0.0344*** 0.0129*** 
 
Panel B: Value Stocks (High book-to-market) 
NUE    PUE 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Post Announcement 
Sentiment 
  Levels Trend Lo Hi   Levels Trend Lo Hi 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX 0.0117*** 0.0071** 
Uncertainty 
Lo ↓∆VIX 0.0028 0.0200*** 
Lo ↑∆VIX 0.0157*** 0.0111*** Lo ↑∆VIX -0.0038 0.0134*** 
Hi ↓∆VIX 0.0136*** 0.0091*** Hi ↓∆VIX 0.0043 0.0215*** 
Hi ↑∆VIX 0.0176*** 0.0131*** Hi ↑∆VIX -0.0023 0.0149*** 
Notes:  
In table 7, we examine whether the impact of uncertainty and Sentiment on the post earnings announcement drift differs for firms of different characteristics. To do so, we 
split our sample by book to market ratio into Value and Growth firms. We then repeat the analysis as set out in equation 3. Panel A display the regression results for the 
sample of Growth stocks (or Low book-to-market stocks). The results for the sample of Value stocks (or high book-to-market stocks) are displayed in Panel B. For ease of 
interpretation, we have formatted the table to show only the results directly related to the impact of uncertainty and the Post announcement sentiment level. For example, the 
panel B of the table indicates where there is low level of Uncertainty at announcement followed by high sentiment but also an increase in uncertainty (VIX↑) in the post 
announcement period,  the coefficient associated with NUE is 0.0111 (i.e., β1 + β7+ β11). Yearly fixed effects are included but not reported in the results. The notations ***, ** 




The impact of announcement time Uncertainty levels and Sentiment on PEAD 
  Full Sample Large Cap  Small Cap  Growth Sample Value Sample 
  NUE NUE NUE NUE NUE 










   Lo Hi  Lo Hi  Lo Hi  Lo Hi  Lo Hi 
VIX Lo 0.0112*** 0.0099*** 0.0084** 0.0122*** 0.0114*** 0.0091*** 0.0148*** 0.0129*** 0.0093*** 0.0084*** 
VIX Hi 0.0155*** 0.0142*** 0.0106** 0.0144*** 0.0134*** 0.0111*** 0.0284*** 0.0265*** 0.0113*** 0.0104*** 
      
 
    
  PUE PUE PUE PUE PUE 










   Lo Hi  Lo Hi  Lo Hi  Lo Hi  Lo Hi 
VIX Lo 0.0000 0.0053 0.0044 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0068 -0.0048 0.0081* 0.0029 0.0023 
VIX Hi 0.0040 0.0093*** -0.0071* -0.0130*** 0.0127*** 0.0210*** -0.0041 0.0089** 0.0108*** 0.0102*** 
Notes:  
In table 8, we examine whether the level of uncertainty and Sentiment (at the time of the announcement) can influence the post earnings announcement drift. To do so we 
run the following regression: 
 
Rit = βo+ β1NUEit + β2PUEit + β3X1NUEit + β4X1PUEit + β5X2NUEit + β6X2PUEit + β7X6NUEit + β8X6PUEit +  β9X7NUEit + β10X7PUEit+ β11log(MVit) + β12BTMVit  + Year 
Effects + εit 
The dependent variable, Rit is the accumulated excess return over the post-announcement period which commences on the second day after the announcement and ends on 
the 60
th
 trading day after the announcement (i.e., t+2 to t+60). The unexpected portion of an earnings announcement is defined as the difference between the actual 
earnings and the consensus earnings estimate in the month immediately prior to announcement. We scaled the unexpected portion of the earnings announcement by the 
actual earnings announced to arrive at our final measure of unexpected earnings. PUE are events where the announced earnings are greater than the expected earnings 
where expected earnings. PUE is calculated by multiplying the unexpected earning by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there is positive earnings surprises 
and 0 otherwise. Similarly, a negative unexpected earnings (NUE) event occurs when the earnings just announced fall short of the consensus analysts forecast earnings. X1 
is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level of VIX at time t ranks in the second tercile where all level 
of market uncertainty (VIX)are ranked from low to high; otherwise X1 = 0. Similarly X2 is equal to 1 where firm i makes an earnings announcement at time t and the level 
of VIX at time t ranks in the third tercile where all level of market uncertainty (VIX)are ranked from low to high; otherwise X2 = 0.X6 = 1 if the return on S&P 500 Index 
(i.e., momentum) over the five-days prior to an earnings announcement (i.e., t-6 to t-2) ranks in the second tercile where all S&P 500 Index returns {t-6, t-2} are ranked 
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from low to high; otherwise X6= 0. X7 = 1 if the return on S&P 500 Index (i.e., momentum) over the five-days prior to an earnings announcement (i.e., t-6 to t-2) ranks in 
the third tercile where all S&P 500 Index returns {t-6, t-2} are ranked from low to high; otherwise X6 = 0. For ease of interpretation, we have formatted the above table to 
show only the results directly related to the impact of VIX levels and the Sentiment (immediately prior to announcement).The table include results for the full sample and 
the characteristic based subsamples. Yearly fixed effects are included but not reported in the results. The notations ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
